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WIRE(LESS) TAPPING: PROTECTING ARKANSANS'
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE ERA OF THE
CLOUD
Erin James*
Every day we surround ourselves with dozens of devices
that monitor our every move, every request, all connecting with
one another and sending massive amounts of data back to the
device manufacturers. The idea of the prosecution placing the
little black cylinder of your Amazon Alexa on the witness stand
and asking Alexa to testify against you seems like something
pulled from an Orwellian nightmare. But, in reality, it is already
occurring.
This futuristic idea originated from a case in our
backyard-State v. Batesl'-involving the murder trial of a
Bentonville, Arkansas, resident.2 After a football watch party
went wrong, one of Bates's guests turned up dead in Bates's hot
tub.3 Bates said he went to bed around one in the morning, but a
witness came forward claiming he heard music playing during
the time Bates alleged he was asleep.4  This prompted
investigators to subpoena tech giant, Amazon, for the transcripts
of Bates's Amazon Alexa to see if the device played music or if
Bates gave a command during this time period.5 This case took
* University of Arkansas School of Law J.D. Candidate 2020. The author would like
to thank Professor Brian Gallini for inspiring the topic of this article and his continued
guidance and feedback throughout the drafting process. The author would also like to
thank Brandon Chapman, an Arkansas Law Review Note & Comment Editor, for devoting
time to provide many suggestions on this article.
1. Complaint, Arkansas v. Bates, No. CR20160370, 2016 WL 7587403 (Cir. Ct.
Benton Cnty. Aug 26, 2016). See also Colin Dwyer, Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder
Case That Hinged on Evidence from Amazon Echo, NPR (Nov. 29, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/3AVG-L3Z8].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Eliott C. McLaughlin & Keith Allen, Alexa, Can You Help with This Murder
Case?, CNN (Dec. 28, 2016), [perma.cc/93JP-EAPP].
5. Id.
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
the national spotlight and prompted Amazon to write a brief
requesting, on First Amendment grounds, that the court quash
the search warrant for Bates's Amazon Alexa. 6 Bates eventually
conceded and turned the information over.
7
Alexa may have been the star that caught the Nation's
attention, but this case illustrated much broader implications.
Investigators found evidence on the deck near the hot tub
showing signs of a struggle. 8 Bates's water company used smart
water meters to keep track of water consumption.9 The police
subpoenaed these records and found that between 1 a.m.-when
Bates claimed he was asleep-and 3 a.m., 140 gallons of water
were used."° Investigators questioned whether this quantity of
water could have been used to wash away blood or other
evidence during clean up.
11
This case was one of the first showing the potential legal
battles that have begun to emerge as we continue to implement
smart devices into our daily lives and homes. With various
smart home devices and other interconnected devices ever
increasing in options and quantities sold, our privacy rights are
more at stake now than ever. 2 Every day, more applications
and functions are added to our arsenal of technology. These
rapid improvements generate even more unique and invasive
data on their users. 
13
Though the Fourth Amendment protects citizens' "right...
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
6. Nat Levy, Amazon Hands over Alexa Data in Arkansas Hot Tub Murder Case, but
1st Amendment Questions Remain, GEEKWIRE (March 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/4AEY-
GJQQ]. While some scholars believe the First Amendment will create standing, I argue
that the Fourth Amendment would provide more comprehensive coverage to data from all
smart devices.
7. Id.
8. McLaughlin & Allen, supra note 4.
9. Dwyer, supra note 1; Josh Hart, Smart Meter Data at Crux of Arkansas Murder
Case, STOP SMART METERS! (Aug. 26, 2016), [https://perma.cc/DPN3-S24N].
10. Tom Dotan & Reed Albergotti, Amazon Echo and the Hot Tub Murder, THE
INFO. (Dec. 27, 2016), [https://perma.cc/JPX2-2GFX].
11. Id.
12. Dieter Bohn, Amazon Says 100 Million Alexa Devices Have Been Sold-What's
Next?, THE VERGE (Jan. 4, 2019), [https://perma.cc/EUL9-36YT]; Johnny Wood, This Is
the Future of Tech in the US, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 7, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9DPY-
B8H7].
13. Daniel Zwerdling, Your Home Is Your... Snitch?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(May 24, 2018), [https://perma.cc/CQQ2-46B8].
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unreasonable searches and seizures," 14 the third-party doctrine
allows for warrantless searches and seizures of information
voluntarily turned over to third parties. 15 As the law currently
stands, the third-party doctrine proceeds virtually unchecked for
data gathered from smart devices as the devices require users to
share data with technology companies, service providers, and
other devices. 16 This allows law enforcement to gain access to
massive amounts of users' data--data that gives a
comprehensive look into a user's life. 17 It is time to retire the
doctrine and create a workable doctrine to give citizens
increased protection. This Article argues that a return to a
property-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment, with the
states playing a stronger role, would result in a more workable
and straightforward approach.
Part I provides an overview of two categories of
technology-personal devices and smart home devices-that
have become woven into society and will continue to grow more
pervasive. This Part will briefly explain how these technologies
work, as it is imperative to understand the inner workings and
how they will relate to the current law. Part II looks at the
development of the Fourth Amendment with a particular focus
on the recent Supreme Court case, Carpenter v. United States.18
This Part illustrates how the Supreme Court has shaped the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in light of advancing
technology. Part III argues that states may now be better-
situated to make key changes in the Fourth Amendment realm
while presenting evidence that Arkansas is open to
differentiating the state Fourth Amendment doctrine from the
federal Fourth Amendment doctrine. Finally, Part IV argues
that a flexible framework largely based on property principles
that would provide Arkansas citizens more Fourth Amendment
protections as technology continues to advance.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
16. Zwerdling, supra note 13.
17. See id.
18. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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I. THE EXPANSIVE DATA GATHERED BY CURRENT
TECHNOLOGY
Today, the tech industry in America is a multi-trillion
dollar per year industry, with the top five technology companies
collectively worth $2.9 trillion.19 Though technology develops
at an exponential rate, the law is several steps behind. Once a
case's final opinion is published, the law can border on
obsolescence. Consider Carpenter, which began in the Eastern
District of Michigan in 2013 and finally reached a decision in
the Supreme Court in 2018.20 By this time, other new and more
problematic (at least in terms of the Fourth Amendment)
technology had surpassed the main concern of the case, which
was cell phone location data.
21
A. The Cloud and Internet of Things
Understanding cloud storage(the Cloud)22 is essential to
understanding the Fourth Amendment issues that current
technology evokes. The Cloud runs on the internet and consists
of both storage and software. 23 Cloud storage allows people to
upload-periodically or constantly, on command or
automatically-various types of data to a remote server.24 The
user can then access his or her data anywhere and potentially on
any device. 25
Each smartphone producer and tech giant has its own
unique cloud available for both personal and business use. A
user can rely on the cloud to backup files for safe keeping,
19. Jeff Desjardins, Chart: Here's How 5 Tech Giants Make Their Billions, VISUAL
CAPITALIST (May 12, 2017), [https://perma.cc/9DTC-9V2L].
20. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212-13.
21. Michael Caccavale, The Impact of the Digital Resolution on the Smart Home
Industry, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018), [https://perma.cc/YKK2-FX5W]. Consumers now have
a plethora of smart home devices that monitor and share the details of what goes on inside
of a home. When viewed together, these devices can give law enforcement a
comprehensive look into the intimate activities of the home and its residents.
22. What Is the Cloud?, GCF GLOBAL, [https://perma.cc/7UQA-E8SQ] (last visited
Oct. 16, 2019).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Anuj Gupta, Understanding Cloud Computing, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/3UNJ-8YE7]. Common cloud platforms include Microsoft's Office
Online, Google Drive, Apple's iCloud, Amazon Cloud Drive, and Dropbox. Id.
Vol. 72:4848
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extend the storage capacity of their device, or work on a variety
of documents from different devices.26 Take Apple's iCloud for
example. Each Apple device owner gets five gigabytes of space
on the iCloud for free and can purchase up to two terabytes of
space.27 The iCloud allows each device owner to store data and
documents on the Cloud and sync the information to the owner's
other Apple devices.28
The Cloud has contributed to the "Internet of Things., 29
The Internet of Things involves multiple devices connecting via
a wireless network and exchanging information with one
another.3 0  This allows information on the Cloud to sync with
multiple devices and provide users with a seamless interaction
between devices. 31  Because this information is stored on a
server owned by someone else, the government must request the
information from the company or owner of the storage.32
B. Devices and Their Features
The plethora of smart devices that gather our personal data
every day creates privacy concerns. Most of these devices
communicate with one another on the Cloud, thus creating even
more legal issues regarding ownership and the third-party
doctrine.3
In 2017 alone, approximately 1.54 billion smartphones
were sold worldwide. 34 Most major tech companies have some
version of a smartphone on the market. Apple dominates the
market with the iPhone, Samsung's Galaxy is another popular
26. iCloud, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/MC3U-XKTM] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Keith Noonan, Understanding Apple's Internet-of-Things in 10 Slides, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (June 28, 2017), [https://perma.cc/7MCH-XEZ8].
30. Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of 'The Internet of Things,' FORBES (May
13, 2014), [https://perma.cc/JGN6-THPA].
31. iCloud, supra note 26.
32. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-75, INTERNET OF THINGS 11,
28-32 (2017). Compare to information that is stored on the device itself. In that case, the
government would have to obtain the device/information from the device owner. This may
mean that the Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination provision could potentially kick in.
33. See id.
34. Arne Hoist, Number of Smartphones Sold to End Users Worldwide from 2007 to
2020 (in Million Units), STATISTA, [https://perma.cc/56HG-B3C8] (last updated Aug. 30,
2019).
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choice, and Google is entering the market with its Pixel.
35
These smartphones hold mass amounts of data. The new iPhone
Xs offers a storage option of a massive 512 gigabytes, 36 though
many smartphone users will never pass the 40-gigabyte
capacity.37  With large capacities, these phones can hold
thousands of personal photos, videos, notes, text messages, apps,
and other documents.
38
With the release of new phones comes the release of new
technology that generates new types of data. This data provides
key insights into our lives and reduces our privacy. For
example, the iPhone contains a Find My Friends feature that
tracks a user's location.39  Siri keeps track of a user's voice
commands.4 0  Apple Wallet stores a user's debit and credit cards
along with various tickets the user has linked.41  Apple Wallet
allows a user to use the phone to pay at businesses that accept
Apple Pay.42 Apple has used biometrics for security since the
introduction of Touch ID.43 Recently, Apple unveiled Face ID
as part of its iPhone X, which relies on facial recognition to
unlock a user's phone and gain access to both apps and Apple
Pay.44
35. See Robert Triggs, 5 Best Selling Smartphones of All Time, ANDROID
AUTHORITY (Aug. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/5FMF-83Z6]; Joe Maring, Google Pixel Is
Now the United States' Fastest-Growing Smartphone Brand [Update], ANDROIDCENTRAL
(Feb. 12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/6FFU-VRA3].
36. iPhone Compare, APPLE, [https://per-ma.cc/KJJ3-2LWJ] (last visited Oct. 4,
2019)
37. See Andrew Martonik Let's Be Honest, 64GB of Internal Storage is Plenty in
2018, ANDROIDCENTRAL (Feb. 2, 2018), [https://perma.ce/83T2-BJXE].
38. iCloud, supra note 26.
39. See Set Up and Use Find My Friends, APPLE SUPPORT,
[https://perma.cc/L6NF-AGCS] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
40. See Siri, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/M35P-65JC] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
41. Use Wallet on Your iPhone or iPod Touch, APPLE SUPPORT,
[https://perma.cc/Z6EM-7ZJB] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
42. Id.
43. Touch ID uses capacitive touch to take high-resolution images of your fingerprint
and creates a mathematical representation of your print. About Touch ID Advanced
Security Technology, APPLE SUPPORT (Sept. 11, 2017), [https://perma.cc/9SK6-PA3K].
It then cross references this to the fingerprint you register. Id. Only the mathematical
representation is stored and all fingerprint data is encrypted. Id.
44. "Face ID provides intuitive and secure authentication enabled by the state-of-the-
art TrueDepth camera system with advanced technologies to accurately map the geometry
of your face. With a simple glance, Face ID securely unlocks your iPhone or iPad Pro."
About Face ID Advanced Technology, supra note 43. Face ID data is encrypted, stays on
your device, and is never backed up to iCloud. Id.
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Additionally, there are many different smart watches that
connect to these smart phones. In 2018, wearables, such as
smart watches and fitness trackers, were expected to gross $6.4
billion with a projected growth of 10% from 2017. 4 5 Smart
watches connect with smart phones, share information with the
phone, and allow the wearer to access most applications,
functions, and notifications from the phone.46 Some watches are
able to generate their own data, including personal health data.47
While the tech giants create the devices, third-party
developers are responsible for creating the millions of
applications users can download. As of the second quarter of
2019, there are over 2.46 million apps to choose from in the
Google Play online store and almost 1.9 million in the Apple
Store. 48  Apps may access a variety of personal data from a
user's phone, including contacts and location. 49 Depending on
the app, the user may be able to choose how much data to share
with the app.50 The app often sends this data back to the
developer for storage and review.51
Smart home devices-including smart speakers-have
increased in popularity and accessibility in recent years. While
smart speakers were expected to bring in only $3.2 billion in
revenue for 2018, that was a projected increase of 64% from
2017.52 Google and Amazon are leading the way with their
smart speakers. 53 These speakers go inside homes or businesses
and connect with many different devices. As of October 2019,
Google offers five types of these devices-Nest Hub, Nest Hub
45. Wood, supra note 12.
46. Apple Watch Series 5, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/X5P2-YURP] (last visited Oct. 4,
2019).
47. Fitbit trackers are equipped with heart rate, activity, and sleep tracking. Our
Technology, FITBIT, [https://perma.cc/ST5K-EUAH] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
48. J. Clement, Number of Apps Available in Leading App Stores as of 2nd Quarter
2019, STATISTA (Aug. 2019), [https://perma.cc/B8B4-4B3D]; J. Clement, Number of
Available Apps at Google Play from 2nd Quarter 2015 to 2nd Quarter 2019, STATISTA
(Aug. 12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/37L3-327L].
49. About Privacy and Location Services in iOS 8 and Later, APPLE SUPPORT
(Sept. 2, 2019), [https://perma.cc/ML34-8FN6].
50. Id.
51. See Third-Party Sites & Apps with Access to Your Account, GOOGLE ACCT.
HELP, [https://perma.cc/D9X5-9SXX] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
52. Wood, supra note 12.
53. Erika Rawes, Google Home vs. Amazon Echo, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 30, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/REZ3-8FC6].
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Max, Home Mini, Home, and Home Max.5 4  Each of these
devices vary in size, with the Home Hub including a display
screen. 55  These devices utilize Google Assistant to listen and
respond to voice commands via a Wi-Fi connection. 56  The
Google Home App allows you to control and manage all of your
devices. 57  This includes allowing you to add or remove third-
party services and view or delete commands.58 According to
Google, their Home devices work with a variety of applications
and technologies for entertainment, energy efficiency, and
security purposes. 59 This includes connecting with televisions,
appliances, plug-ins, lights, thermostats, and many other
devices. 60
Similarly, Amazon produces the Amazon Echo in several
models. The Echo and Echo Dot are classic speakers, while the
Echo Show and Echo Spot include a display.6' These devices
are controlled by Amazon Alexa, a virtual assistant that
functions like Google Assistant.62 Alexa works by constantly
listening for her "wake word" which initiates a response to
subsequent commands.63  Amazon also has an Alexa app that
allows you to manage your settings and review or delete
previous commands. 64 Alexa works with a variety of devices,
54. Google Home Mini Specs, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/NY3B-J78W] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2019); Google Nest Hub: Tech Specs, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/QJ8C-
EWSK] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); Google Home: Tech Specs, GOOGLE,
[https://perma.cc/CT9Q-FVL6] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); Google Home Max: Tech Specs,
GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/MP2R-TA97] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
55. See supra note 54 (detailing the different sizes of devices and features).
56. Google Assistant: What It Can Do, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/9Z8A-58NU] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2019).
57. See Google Home Mini: Overview, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/S97J-TQND] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2019); Meet the Google Home App, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/N6B9-
DYEV] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
58. Google Home: Overview, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/9UA7-4LX4] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2019).
59. Google Home: Works With, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/R399-U88S] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2019).
60. Id.
61. See Amazon Echo & Alexa Devices, AMAZON, [https://perma.cc/T3MS-2633]
(last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
62. All Things Alexa: Alexa Features, AMAZON, [https://perma.cc/KZ9A-Y72Q] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2019).
63. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, [https://perma.cc/W46A-U8L9] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2019). The default wake word is "Alexa," but users can set a custom wake
word through the Alexa app. Id.
64. Id.
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much like the Google Home.65 Additionally, it allows you to
place calls, order things from Amazon, and install or create your
own Alexa "skills." 66 Skills are programmable tasks and apps
that users can personalize and control with their voice.67
Amazon continues to expand its line of products by offering
headphones and car components that have Alexa built in.68
Smart speakers are only the tip of the iceberg for smart
home devices. Other smart home devices had an anticipated
gross revenue of $4.6 billion for 2018, achieving a 36%
projected growth from 2017.69 These devices run the gamut
from thermostats, lightbulbs, outlets, security cameras, utility
usage monitors, locks, vacuums, and appliances. 70 Such devices
use an internet connection to pair with other devices, like
Google Home or Amazon Alexa. 7 1
C. Service Providers
Along with the data gathered by various device features,
service providers constantly track a device's location. The
smartphone's features and apps work together with service
providers to create a comprehensive map of a device owner's
location.72 Service providers have towers across the nation.73 A
smartphone constantly "pings" these towers to obtain service
and use location services. 74  As the technology improves, the
ability to narrow the phone's location down to a smaller radius
65. Id.; Google Home: Works With, supra note 59.
66. See Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 63.
67. See Kevin Webb, These Were the 25 Most Popular Alexa Skills of 2018,
According to Amazon, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2018), [https://perma.cc/MC8Q-NR2F].
68. Amazon Echo and Alexa Devices, supra note 61.
69. Johnny Wood, This Is the Future of Tech in the US, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 7,
2018), [https://perma.cc/5N3N-NJQS].
70. See Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 63; Google Home: Works With,
supra note 59.
71. See Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 63; Google Home: Overview,
supra note 58.
72. See Brief Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, at 10-13, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017
WL 4512266.
73. See id. at 6.
74. See id. at 10.
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increases.75 This accuracy improves if multiple towers are used
to triangulate the phone's location. 76  This information is then
kept with the phone's service provider.
77
D. Privacy Policies
With the mass amounts of data gathered on consumers,
technology companies realize the necessity of privacy. Each
company has a privacy page on their website that lists the
various protections they provide for their users. 78  Apple's
privacy page boasts that "[y]our personal data belongs to you,
not others." 79 However, Apple further clarifies that the phrase
means that Apple does not sell your data to third parties.
80
Apple, along with the other technology companies, can and will
turn over your data to law enforcement. In fact, technology
companies even have online guides for legal requests including
subpoenas, search warrants, and court orders. 81 Apple's Legal
Process Guidelines is a fourteen-page document that describes
how to serve process and what information is available from
Apple. 82  Law enforcement does utilize the legal process to
obtain users' data from technology companies, and the
companies do comply. Several technology companies publish
biannual Transparency Reports that detail the legal requests they
75. See Phil Locke, Cell Tower Triangulation-How It Works, WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS BLOG (June 1, 2012), [https://perma.cc/VD88-FQV5].
76. ld.
77. See Webb, supra note 67; Melissa Locker, U.S. Cell Carriers Are Probably Still
Selling Your Real-Time Phone Location Data, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/R7D7-6B54]. In January 2019, journalists uncovered that major service
providers were selling user's location data to third parties. Joseph Cox, I Gave a Bounty
Hunter $300. Then He Located Our Phone, VICE (Jan. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/92QR-
R5FQ]; Locker, supra note 77.
78. Privacy, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/T98Y-J3CP] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019);
Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/TL42-XL5Z] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019);
Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON, [https://perma.cc/9QDQ-T7Q9] (last visited Feb. 20,
2019).
79. Privacy, APPLE, supra note 78.
80. Id.; Privacy Policy, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/VFQ5-VX2U] (last visited Oct. 4,
2019).
81. Privacy: Legal Process Guidelines, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/WQ52-Y6G7] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2018); Amazon Law Enforcement Guidelines, AMAZON,
[https://perma.cc/X39U-9A53] (last visited Feb. 24, 2018); Legal Process for User Data
Requests FAQs, GOOGLE, [https://perma.cc/ZQB6-4DRU] (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
82. Privacy: Legal Process Guidelines, supra note 81.
Vol. 72:4854
WIRE(LESS) TAPPING
receive and the amount that are responded to.8 3  Three
prominent technology companies received a combined total of
110,444 requests in 2017.84 Of those requests, 73,963 were
responded to by the companies, resulting in a 66.9% response
rate. 85
Table 1:86
Company Total Requests Response
Requests for Responded To Rate
2017
Apple 8,929 7,113 79.7%
Amazon 3,697 2,779 75.2%
Google 97,818 64,071 65.5%
Total 110,444 73,963 66.9%
H. THE PATH TO CARPENTER
As the Fourth Amendment encounters new technology and
shifting policy stances, the doctrine becomes more nuanced and
convoluted. The original purpose of the Fourth Amendment was
to limit the government's power to engage in extensive searches
and seizures.8 7  To accomplish this, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of "persons,
houses, papers, and effects." 88  As a threshold matter, courts
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a search or
seizure by evaluating if the police trespassed on a textually
83. Privacy: Transparency Report, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/XNQ4-B2WN] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2018); Amazon Information Request Report, AMAZON (Jan. 1, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/T93F-775P]; Amazon Information Request Report, AMAZON (July 1,
2017) [https://perma.cc/UL7G-JJBD]; Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
[https://perma.cc/AJZ4-TCQ8] (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
84. See infra Table 1.
85. See id.
86. This data was compiled from the sources listed in supra note 83.
87. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,463 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the
Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1449-51 (2017).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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protected area, 89 or if the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
90
A. The Ebb and Flow of the Fourth Amendment Standards
Under the trespass standard, the police must trespass on one
of the four constitutionally protected areas: persons, houses,
papers, or effects.9 1  The first two categories are relatively
straightforward; however, papers and effects are somewhat of a
grey area. To provide more clarity, courts draw from property
and common law when determining whether a trespass has
occurred.
Boyd v. United States was one of the first cases to provide
an in-depth evaluation of the trespass doctrine. 92 In Boyd, the
government alleged that the defendants failed to pay duties on
imported goods. 93  The government obtained a subpoena
requiring the defendants to produce documents relating to the
importation of the goods. 9 4 On Fourth Amendment grounds, the
Supreme Court made two prominent assertions. First, the
Fourth Amendment applies to a person's property unless the
government can indicate a possessory right in the object under
property law.95 However, exceptions were noted, primarily that
property law requirements did not exist for contraband.
96
Second, the Court confirmed the sanctity of private papers and
the contents thereof.97 The opinion quoted language from the
English case Entick v. Carrington:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they
are his dearest property; and are so far from
enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an
inspection; and though the eye cannot by the
89. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012).
90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
91. Mary E. Bisantz, Electronic Eavesdropping Under the Fourth Amendment After
Berger and Katz, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 455,459-60,464 (1968).
92. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
93. Id. at 617-18.
94. Id. at 618.
95. See id. at 623-24.
96. Id. at 624.
97. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-28; see also Morgan Cloud, Property Is Privacy: Locke
and Brandeis in the Twenty-First Century, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 37, 53-55 (2018).
Vol. 72:4856
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laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet
where private papers are removed and carried
away the secret nature of those goods will be an
aggravation of the trespass, and demand more
considerable damages in that respect. 98
This case, along with historical documentation, indicates
that the Founders had a more liberal view of property rights in
mind when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified. 99
Drawing from Whig concepts and John Lock's views, property
not only included tangible objects, but intangible things such as
rights, thoughts, and expressions.100 James Madison echoed
these sentiments in his essay entitled Property.1° 1  There he
wrote that "man is said to have a right to his property, he may be
equally said to have a property in his rights."'10 2 An overarching
theme was that expression of the self was included in the term
property. 10 3 This was further evidenced in the seminal article
The Right to Privacy by Charles Warren and Louis Brandeis. 10 4
After creating this "right to privacy," Warren and Brandeis
asserted that such a right encompasses one's personality,10 5 and
that only publication by the author himself forgoes such a
right. 1
06
Despite the broad protections under the trespass view
during the 1800s and early 1900s, the protections began to
constrict with Olmstead v. United States.0 7  There, the Court
applied the trespass standard to determine whether wiretapping a
phone line that ran between the defendant's house and business
constituted a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. 10 8  The
Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable in
98. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627-28.
99. Cloud, supra note 97, at 49-50.
100. Id. at 43-48.
101. Id. at 47-50; Madison's essay Property was published in the National Gazette on
March 29, 1792. It can be found in 6 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, 101 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
102. Cloud, supra note 97, at 48.
103. See id. at 49-50.
104. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 194-95, 205 (1890).
105. Id. at 205-06.
106. Id. at 198-200.
107. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
108. Id. at 455-57.
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such a situation because the police were intercepting electronic
signals from a line outside of the defendant's home. 
109
It is in this context that a new standard emerged in Katz v.
United States. 110 There, the defendant used a public telephone
booth, which the government had attached a listening and
recording device to.11 1 The defense framed the questions for the
Court as: was the phone booth a constitutionally protected area
and "[w]hether physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area is necessary" for a Fourth Amendment
violation?1 12 The Court rejected these issues, stating "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."11 3  The issue was
reframed broadly as "whether the search... complied with
constitutional standards."'
114
In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart alluded to the idea
of a reasonable expectation standard. 115 The test was more fully
elucidated by Justice Harlan in his Katz concurrence.11 6 This
standard was both subjective and objective. Step one asked if
the person had "an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy.",117 Step two then evaluated if that "expectation [was]
one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."
1 18
Over the years, the test eventually became more condensed,
primarily focusing on the second prong.
119
The Court was clear that the reasonable expectation of
privacy test supplements the trespass analysis rather than fully
replacing it.120  To further complicate matters, the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard paved the way for the
emergence of the third-party doctrine. Less than a decade after
Katz, the Court determined that "a person has no legitimate
109. Id. at 466. But see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961)
(holding the insertion of a microphone into the air ducts of a home was a search under the
Fourth Amendment).
110. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
111. Id. at 348.
112. Id. at 349-50.
113. Id. at 351.
114. Id. at 354.
115. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
116. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 361.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
120. Id. at 2267-68 (internal citations omitted).
Vol. 72:4858
WIRE(LESS) TAPPING
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties."'1 21 Thus, allowing the government to search
documents that one furnishes to a third-party without a
warrant. 1
22
In United States v. Miller, the government obtained the
defendant's bank statements without a warrant. 123  The Court
reasoned that negotiable instruments are not private
communication, and the bank created and kept these documents
for business purposes. 124  In reaching such a conclusion, the
Court rejected Boyd and found that the bank owned the
"business records;" therefore, the defendant could not assert a
privacy right in property they did not own. 125  In Smith v.
Maryland, the Court used a pen register to determine the
numbers dialed from a phone without a warrant. 126 Here, the
Court applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test and held
there was no search because the defendant "voluntarily
conveyed" the information and "assumed the risk.', 127
As the Court has encountered cases that address modern
technology, it has grappled with the interplay between the
Fourth Amendment and third-party doctrine. In her concurrence
in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor stated that "it may
be necessary to reconsider [the third-party doctrine]," as it is "ill
suited for the digital age.",128  Additionally, the reasonable
expectation test has received substantial criticism. The major
critique is deciding if the Court should evaluate this prong on a
normative or empirical basis. 129 A normative application would
ask what privacy rights we should recognize, while an empirical
application would ask what privacy rights we actually do
have. 130 The normative and empirical models both present one
121. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding that the third-party doctrine still applied "even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose").
122. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
123. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437-38.
124. Id. at 442-43.
125. Id. at 440-41.
126. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
127. Id. at 744-45 (internal quotations omitted).
128. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
129. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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major flaw: who should actually be making policy decisions and
interpreting societal values? 131 Under either model, courts and
judges will be making these decisions, when in reality, the
legislature likely has a better understanding of what we think or
want to be considered as private.1 32 Additionally, the empirical
model may lead to conflict as someone will still have to interpret
and decide what privacy rights we do have. For example,
Justice Gorsuch points out that many citizens believe that our
privacy rights decrease as the severity of the crime increases.
133
In reality, the Fourth Amendment applies the same regardless of
the crime.13
4
In 2011, the trespass doctrine made a return in Jones.
135
Prior to Jones, the Court ruled on United States v. Knotts, and
applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 136 In Knotts,
the government placed a tracking "beeper" inside a container in
the defendant's car.' 37  The Court declined to find a privacy
interest because the location of the car and its final destination
were "voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.', 138
However, the Court noted that the tracking in Knotts was
confined to one specific trip, and the outcome or principles may
be different for long-term tracking. 139 That held true when the
Court encountered Jones. In Jones, the government installed a
GPS on the defendant's car and tracked his location for twenty-
eight days. 140  But Jones was distinguishable from Knotts
because the government attached the GPS directly to Jones's
car,141 whereas in Knotts the tracking device was put into a third
131. Id.
132. Id. See Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1095 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) ("It is the
role of the legislature, not the judiciary, to balance public policy interests and enact law.");
Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal. 1992) ("'[P]ublic policy' as a concept is
notoriously resistant to precise definition, and that courts should venture into this area, if at
all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the legislative branch, 'lest they
mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law."').
133. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012).
136. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81, 285 (1983).
137. Id. at 278.
138. Id. at 281-82.
139. See id. at 283-84.
140. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
141. Id.
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party's container before being placed in Knotts's vehicle. 142 The
car in Jones was legally owned by the defendant's wife;
however, Justice Scalia drew from the principals of bailment to
find that the car was the defendant's. 143 Because the car
constituted the defendant's property, the Court found that the
installation of the GPS constituted a trespass on a textually
protected area, and therefore, a Fourth Amendment search
occurred. 144
B. The Carpenter Majority
With the reemergence of the trespass doctrine in Jones,
objections towards the applicability of the reasonable
expectation of privacy and third-party doctrines, and the Court
requiring warrants for cell phone searches in the search incident
to arrests context a few years prior in Riley v. California,145
Carpenter v. United States seemed to be the perfect opportunity
for the Court to greatly expand Fourth Amendment protections
for cell phones and technology. When the Carpenter opinion
was released, it was evident that the Court barely scratched the
surface on what needed to be done to protect citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights in the digital age. Instead, the Court added in
yet even more nuance and confusion to the already complicated
mix.
In Carpenter, the government subpoenaed two wireless
carriers seeking the defendant's cell-site location information
(CSLI). 14 6  That information enabled the government to
triangulate the defendant's location.147 Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the majority, preliminarily noted that CSLI and cell
phone records have a "unique nature." 148 He also observed that
a cell phone is "almost a 'feature of human anatomy"' 149 that is
taken almost everywhere and is capable of acting as "an intimate
142. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
143. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 n.2 ("If Jones was not the owner he had at least the
property rights of a bailee.").
144. Id. at 404-05.
145. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). The court prohibited warrantless
searches of a cell phone seized incident to arrest. Id.
146. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
147. Id. at 2212-13.
148. Id. at 2217.
149. Id. at 2218.
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window into a person's life,"' 150 by revealing their "familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."
'151
While the reasonable expectation of privacy standard was
used, the majority refused to apply the third-party doctrine for
which the government advocated. 152 Applying the third-party
doctrine in this case would have been "a significant extension of
[the third-party doctrine] to a distinct category of
information."'1 53  The rejection of the third-party doctrine
stemmed from the government's failure "to appreciate that there
are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of
CSLI. '' 154 This decision turned on two factors: the presence of
location information and a lack of voluntary conveyance. 155 The
Court reasoned that there was no voluntary conveyance because
cell-phone usage is so pervasive that it is almost necessary for
one to own a cell phone, and CSLI data is obtained with
minimal affirmative actions by the cell phone owner-all that is
required is turning on the phone.
1 56
In sum, Chief Justice Roberts found that the comprehensive
and revealing amount of data, which can be obtained
retroactively and often collected without any affirmative action
on the owner's part created a privacy interest that could not be
overcome by the third-party doctrine.1 57 Implicit in the opinion,
is the idea that some data or information alone may not require a
warrant, but when aggregated, the nature of the data transforms
to the point that a warrant is required. 158 However, no further
guidance was provided.
The majority ultimately held that obtaining CSLI data
requires probable cause and a warrant. 159  But the majority
150. Id. at 2217.
151. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (internal quotations omitted).
152. Id. at 2216-17.
153. Id. at 2219.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 2219-20.
156. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
157. Id. at 2223.
158. See Sabrina McCubbin, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Carpenter v.
Unites States, LAWFARE (June 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/ZCF6-C4GT]; see Amy Howe,
Opinion Analysis: Court Holds That Police Will Generally Need a Warrant for Sustained
Cellphone Location Information, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/2B9R-
ASFZ].
159. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
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explicitly clarified that Carpenter does not: (1) express a view
on "real-time CSLI or 'tower dumps;"' (2) disturb the
application of the third-party doctrine to "conventional
surveillance techniques and tools;" (3) "address other business
records that might incidentally reveal location information;" or
(4) impact investigation techniques used for national security. 160
Furthermore, Carpenter does not limit application of other
exceptions to the warrant requirement, like the prospect of
warrantless access to CSLI data if the facts give rise to an
exigent circumstance.' 61
On the merits, the Court held that the government's
subpoena request constituted a "search" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 162 The Court noted that its decision was
a narrow one, 163 but the convoluted reasoning left unanswered
questions which prompted four dissents. Concerns from the
dissenters generally focused on two key areas. First, the
dissenters expressed concerns that the Court added yet another
nuance to the Fourth Amendment's application.' 64  These
concerns stemmed from the majority calling out CSLI as a
"distinct category of information" without providing further
guidance for future issues.' 65 This was important as it was the
majority's deciding factor for whether the third-party doctrine
applied. 166  Second, the dissenters called out the majority for
alluding to instances where warrantless searches of distinct
information may be acceptable without providing further
guidelines. 167
C. The Carpenter Dissents
This narrow majority opinion did little in reconciling the
Fourth Amendment, the third-party doctrine, and modern
technology. As a result, it prompted several dissents. Justice
Kennedy criticized the Carpenter decision for "fail[ing] 'to
160. Id. at 2220.
161. Id. at 2223.
162. Id. at 2220.
163. Id.
164. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
166. Id. at 2220.
167. Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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provide clear guidance to law enforcement' and courts on key
issues raised by its reinterpretation of Miller and Smith., 168 For
example, he wrote the majority failed to discuss how to
determine if something is a "distinct category of information"
and how much information is required to obtain a search
warrant. 169 Justice Kennedy concludes by stating that the proper
outcome would have "interpret[ed] accepted property principles
as the baseline for reasonable expectations of privacy" and
remanding the case.
170
In a second dissent, Justice Thomas suggested refraining
the question to focus on "whose property was searched" rather
than if a search occurred.171 Although Justice Thomas relied on
property principles, he disagreed with Justice Kennedy's use of
such principles in the context of a reasonable expectation
analysis. 172  Justice Thomas preferred to read the Fourth
Amendment literally, which would wholly reject the Katz test. 1
73
That test, he wrote, has "no plausible foundation in the text of
the Fourth Amendment" 174 and "confuses the reasons for
exercising the protected right with the right itself."
175
Justice Alito penned a third dissent that also focused
heavily on property law principles.' 76  First, he agreed with
Justice Kennedy that the defendant did not own the CSLI
records under a strict property law analysis. 177 Second, Justice
Alito added that even under the Katz test and third-party
doctrine, the defendant "lack[ed] any meaningful property-based
connection" to the CSLI records held by the service providers.178
In a fourth dissent, Justice Gorsuch took a different
approach. Although he disfavored keeping the third-party
doctrine on "life support," he fundamentally shared the
168. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014)).
169. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2235.
171. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
172. Id. at 2236.
173. Id.
174. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotations omitted).
175. Id. at 2240 (quoting THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 78 (2008)) (internal quotations omitted).
176. Id. at 2259-60 (Alito, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2260.
178. Id.
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majority's view that the rationale behind the third-party doctrine
is wrong.1 79  Accordingly, Justice Gorsuch proposed three
options: keep the third-party doctrine and "live with the
consequences," ask only if there is "'a reasonable expectation of
privacy' in data held by third parties," or do something
different. 180  After dismissing options one and two on the
grounds that they, respectively, would leave government
unchecked,1 8' Justice Gorsuch instead focused on his third
option. His proposed solution would incorporate traditional
property principles, like bailment, while also allowing the
legislature to step in and help clarify ownership and privacy
issues with data. 182  Justice Gorsuch wrote that his proposal
could increase Fourth Amendment protections, comply with a
textual interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, reduce "judicial
intuition," and incorporate state law. 183
I. A RETURN TO OLD IDEALS FOR NEW
TECHNOLOGY
As previously indicated, modem technology poses two key
issues for the Fourth Amendment. First, technology is
developing at an exponential rate while the law is several steps
behind. This creates a "Fourth Amendment lag.' ' 184  The lag
increases if a case makes it on the Supreme Court's docket.185
Another critical issue is how to reconcile the third-party doctrine
with advancing, interconnected technology. 186  While the
Carpenter Court declined to apply the third-party doctrine to
location data, it kept the doctrine "on life support."'1 87  This
suggests that the third-party doctrine can still apply to devices
that do not track the user's location. If true, the government
could potentially obtain all of the data from a user's smart home
179. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2262, 2264.
181. Id. at 2264, 2266-67.
182. See id. at 2267-70.
183. See id. at 2268-70.
184. Richards, supra note 87, at 1448 (internal quotations omitted).
185. See id. at 1456-57, 1465, 1488.
186. Id. at 1482-83.
187. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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device-like an Amazon Alexa or Google Home that obtains
data from a multitude of other smart devices.
Carpenter failed to create a workable standard that can
apply to current and future technology. Justice Gorsuch
described three paths from which we can choose. 88  Path one
would continue to apply the third-party doctrine, leaving mass
amounts of private information exposed. Path two would have
judges apply the Katz test, giving them a lot of discretion and
potentially acting as the third-party doctrine in disguise. Path
three would propose a new solution. Given the examples
illustrated in the preceding paragraph, the third path is the best
option.
States, and especially Arkansas, can provide its own
citizens adequate protection under their own constitutions.
Through judicial federalism, states can interpret their
constitutions more broadly than the United States
Constitution. 189  As states begin to interpret constitutional
provisions differently than the federal courts, such as the Fourth
Amendment,'9" there is evidence indicating that the Supreme
Court may follow suit. In three instances-adoption of the
exclusionary rule, 191  allowing warrantless probable cause
arrests, 192 and permitting warrantless entries into homes' 9 3-the
Supreme Court looked to state laws and trends when
formulating their opinions. 94
Evidence suggests that Arkansas and other states might use
judicial federalism to depart from the third-party doctrine. One
2006 study conducted a fifty-state survey of how each state
applied Fourth Amendment principles. 195 At that time, thirty-
188. Id. at 2262.
189. Alexander Justiss, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection & Due Process-Is
the Arkansas Supreme Court Abandoning Judicial Federalism?, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 105,106 (2007).
190. Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United States
Supreme Court Shows State Courts the Way, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 499, 502-03
(2002).
191. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
192. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,423-24 (1976).
193. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598-601 (1980).
194. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29; Watson, 423 U.S. at 421-22; Payton, 445 U.S. at 598-99.
195. Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395 (2006).
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two states had diverged or gave reason to suspect they might
diverge from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. 196  Eleven of these states rejected the third-party
doctrine. 197 The study classified Arkansas as a state that might
reject the third-party doctrine.'1
98
The Fourth Amendment of the Arkansas Constitution has
identical language to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 199 Because of this, Arkansas originally took
the stance that it would not deviate from the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.2 ° ° In 2000, that view
changed in State v. Sullivan with the Arkansas Supreme Court
writing, "there is nothing that prevents this court from
interpreting the U.S. Constitution more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more
rights.",20 1 Despite that language, the Supreme Court declined to
construe Arkansas' constitutional provisions differently than the
United States Constitution.20 2
Since Sullivan, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
thematically focused its judicial review on the Arkansas
Constitution rather than the United States Constitution,
particularly in the context of pretextual arrests and warrantless
consent searches. 20 3  By interpreting the State's Fourth
Amendment differently, Arkansas courts can provide citizens
196. Id.
197. Jd.
198. Id.
199. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."), with ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 15 ("The right of the people of this State to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, except
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.").
200. Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552, 556, 895 S.W.2d 457, 460 (1995).
201. State v. Sullivan (Sullivan 1), 340 Ark. 315, 318-C, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (2000),
rev'd, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
202. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001).
203. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 467, 156 S.W.3d 722, 727 (2004) ("[W]e are not
bound by the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when interpreting our own
law.").
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with comparatively more protections than its federal
counterparts while evading federal review.
20 4
In Sullivan, the defendant was stopped for a traffic
violation and arrested when narcotics were found in his
possession. 20 5 On remand, the court held that pretextual arrests
are unreasonable and therefore subject to the exclusionary
rule.20 6 It reasoned that Arkansas precedent historically viewed
pretextual arrests as unreasonable.
20 7
Next, consider consent searches. In Griffin v. State,
officers engaged in a nighttime warrantless search of Griffin's
shed and car before gaining his consent.20 8 The Court held this
search invalid because officers must give an individual the
opportunity to reject a warrantless search before conducting the
search.20 9 Two key factors impacted the Court's reasoning and
ultimate decision to depart from federal standards. First,
Arkansas required police officers to comply with "rigorous
standards" to obtain a warrant for a nighttime search.21 0 Second
and more importantly, similar issues regarding actual consent
during knock-and-talk searches were frequenting dockets across
several states.
211
Only a few months after Griffin, in Jegley v. Picado, the
Arkansas Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas statute that
criminalized sodomy.212 In Jegley, the Court established the
right to privacy as a fundamental right accorded to citizens in
the Arkansas Constitution.21 3 The Court reasoned that more
than eighty statutes referenced privacy, which the Court viewed
as "a public policy ... supporting a right to privacy. '"214 The
204. See Henderson, supra note 195, at 375 (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion
that any state relying on its constitution "immunizes its decision from review by [the]
Court").
205. Sullivan 1, 340 Ark. 315,318-B, 16 S.W.3d at 551-52.
206. State v. Sullivan (Sullivan II), 348 Ark. 647, 655-56, 74 S.W.3d 215, 221
(2002).
207. Id.
208. Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 795-97, 67 S.W.3d 582, 587-88 (2002).
209. Id. at 800, 67 S.W.3d at 590.
210. Id. at 793, 67 S.W.3d at 585.
211. Id. at 801, 67 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring).
212. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 636-38, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353-54 (2002).
213. Id. at 630-32, 80 S.W.3d at 349-50.
214. Id. at 628-29, 80 S.W.3d at 347-48.
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Court concluded by stating that "Arkansas has a rich and
compelling tradition of protecting individual privacy." 215
Jegley played a key role when Arkansas deviated from
federal precedent again in State v. Brown.216 There, the police
obtained the homeowner's consent to search her house but failed
to inform her of her right to refuse consent.2 17 Relying on
Jegley, the Court reasoned that there is a sacrosanct zone of
privacy around a person's home, and that "Arkansas has clearly
embraced a heightened privacy protection for citizens in their
homes against unreasonable searches and seizures." 218  The
Brown opinion not only expanded citizens' rights in the consent
context, it also explained that Arkansas courts will deviate from
federal precedent "when the result is patently wrong and so
manifestly unjust that a break becomes unavoidable. '" 219
Although these cases provide an overview of when
Arkansas will deviate from federal interpretation, Arkansas
courts may decline to deviate if there is a "difficulty in
balancing interests and setting rules."220 Given this framework,
it seems likely that Arkansas would reject the third-party,
doctrine so long as a workable test replaces it. The technology
discussed in Section I essentially gives the police warrantless
access to all of a user's data and information through the third-
party doctrine, 221 which, in effect, reduces Fourth Amendment
rights "to nearly nothing., 2 22  Surely that is a result that an
Arkansas court could find "patently wrong and so manifestly
unjust., 223
IV. HOW TO APPROACH UNDER THE TRESPASS
THEORY
In the closing remarks of his Carpenter dissent, Justice
Gorsuch chastised the defense for failing to argue the
215. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 349-50.
216. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460,462, 156 S.W.3d 722, 724 (2004).
217. d. at 464-65, 156 S.W.3d at 725.
218. Id. at 469-70, 156 S.W.3d at 729.
219. Id. at 473, 156 S.W.3d at 731.
220. See State v. Harris, 372 Ark. 492, 500, 277 S.W.3d 568, 575-76 (2008)
(declining to extend heightened privacy protections to vehicles).
221. See discussion supra Section I.
222. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
223. Brown, 356 Ark. at 473, 156 S.W.3d at 731.
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applicability of state laws or the trespass standard despite Jones
and Florida v. Jardines providing notice of the Court's
willingness to hear such arguments.224  Additionally, the
majority opinion reminds us that "the analysis is informed by the
historical understandings 'of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted."', 225  Thus, by arguing the trespass standard in data
cases and including historical and state property laws in the
analysis, defendants may be able to successfully bypass the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine and the
accompanying third-party doctrine. 221 Such an approach may
have more success at the state level, 227 but the Carpenter
decisions seems to indicate that the approach will not
automatically fail at the federal level. This section will evaluate
potential arguments rooted in property law that can establish a
textually protected interest in data.
A. Protected Category
Like the United States Constitution, the Arkansas
Constitution protects persons, houses, papers, and effects.228
Data stored on servers and microchips does not neatly fit into
any of these categories. Drawing from federal historical
perspectives, certain types of data-such as texts, emails,
documents, etc.-could fall into the category of expressive or
content property that the Founders held sacred.229 Other data
must be deemed to be a paper or an effect. Case law indicates
that demonstrating a possessory interest may fulfill this
requirement.2 3 °
224. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2213-14. (majority opinion).
226. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012).
227. See supra Section H1l.
228. See Brown, 356 Ark. at 469-70, 156 S.W.3d at 728-29 (describing the evolution
and extent of Arkansas constitutional protections).
229. See supra Part 11(a).
230. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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B. Ownership
Ownership of property requires an owner to exercise
dominion and control over property while also having an intent
to own.23 1 Other property rights such as free alienability and the
right to exclude all others may also help to define ownership. 232
At first blush, it may seem that users do not possess these rights
in the context of their data, as companies may also exert
dominion and control over the data. For example, companies
may use an individual's data for advertising, to improve user
experience, and may even share the data with third parties. 233
But when evaluating user accessibility, most companies allow
users some control over their data. Google, for instance, allows
users to download a copy of all of their data, delete or modify
saved data, and also place certain restrictions on what third-
parties may use or obtain.234 Such capabilities seem to establish
dominion and control over the data collected.
Data users also have a right to exclude all others from
accessing their data. Data management tools aside, most
devices allow users to choose how much data they share with
other applications and companies. Apple either discloses what
companies they may share your data with or requires you to
accept data sharing with other entities-usually in the form of a
pop-up notification that requires you choose to "accept" or
"decline" the company's policy.235 The ability of users to delete
gathered data or provide encryptions also excludes the
companies or providers from accessing the data.236 Finally, a
user's data is freely alienable. Most companies allow users to
determine how much data they want to share, and with whom.237
Data may, for example, be shared with another technology
company, a private party, or law enforcement.238
231. See SHELDON F. KURTZ ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY
SURVEY 1-2 (7th ed. 2018).
232. See id.
233. See discussion supra Parts I(b), (d).
234. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, supra note 78.
235. Privacy: Approach to Privacy, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/FXG6-YR4U] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019).
236. See GOOGLE, supra note 78.
237. See supra Part IV(b).
238. See supra Section 1.
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Furthermore, Apple uses differential learning to improve its
services. 239  Differential learning uses data patterns from all
users as opposed to a user's personal data.240 Users reserve their
data privacy as "[d]ifferential privacy transforms the
information shared with Apple before it ever leaves the user's
device such that Apple can never reproduce the true data. ' '241
Therefore, in these cases, the company or third parties do not
have access to the user's personal data. This would eliminate
many third-party doctrine concerns. Because the company does
not receive "clear data" or any user identifications, the user
maintains dominion and control over their data. It also follows
that users can choose whether to share their data with others or
242not, meeting the freely alienable and right of exclusion
elements. Companies that employ differential learning give
users a stronger argument that users "own" their data.
Case law illustrates that exclusive possession may not be
required to establish a property right in the data. Consider home
ownership where a family may all live in one house and have
authority to consent to a search of the house despite all family
members not being listed on the deed.243 By contrast, in rental
situations, a landlord may not consent to a search of a tenant's
space.244 The Supreme Court has held that effective consent by
non-owners, other than landlords, relies on 'common authority'
over the premises ... [and] rest[s] on 'mutual use of the
property' by one 'having joint access or control for most
purposes. '245 Thus, a spouse may consent to searches of the
239. Differential Privacy, APPLE, [https://perma.cc/QP4M-PLQT](last visited Oct. 6,
2019).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See supra Part IV(b).
243. See, e.g., Bruce v. State, 367 Ark. 497, 502-03, 241 S.W.3d 728, 731-32 (2006)
(finding wife had authority to consent to search of home); Grant v. State, 267 Ark. 50, 56-
57, 589 S.W.2d 11, 14 (1979) (holding the stepfather could consent to search of stepson's
bedroom despite the stepson paying rent); Washington v. State, 251 Ark. 487, 492, 473
S.W.2d 157, 160 (1971) (finding the warrantless search valid where a regular occupant of
the apartment let the police in).
244. Breshears v. State, 94 Ark. App. 192, 197-98, 228 S.W.3d 508, 511-12 (2006);
see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961).
245. JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN A NUTSHELL § 2.13(d), at 158 (8th ed. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
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home, but a visitor may not.24 6 The question becomes "whether
the one giving consent possesses common authority or other
sufficient relationship to the premises." 247  Applying this
doctrine to the data context, a company most likely lacks "joint
access or control" over the user's data.2 48 Accordingly, a
company cannot consent to turn over a user's data without a
search warrant. However, even if a company possessed joint or
apparent authority over the data, the company would be wise to
institute a policy of refusing consent and requiring officers to
obtain a warrant.
Although traditional property law indicates that users have
an ownership interest in their data, a different analytical
approach may be preferable. In his Carpenter dissent, Justice
Thomas suggests that companies' terms of service may establish
property rights in data.2 4 9 While Carpenter's contracts with
Sprint and MetroPCS did not give Carpenter ownership over the
location data, Justice Thomas stated that "such provisions could
exist in the marketplace" 250  and cited Google's terms of
service. 251 This could shift the onus to technology companies to
include this simple phrase to protect their customers. However,
this could restrict the company's ability to utilize users' data.
C. Bailment
Bailment is "delivery of personalty for some particular
purpose, or on mere deposit, upon a contract, express or implied,
that after the purpose has been fulfilled it shall be redelivered to
the person who delivered it, or otherwise dealt with according to
his directions." 252 In Arkansas, there are three key elements to
246. See id.
247. Grant, 267 Ark. at 55, 589 S.W.2d at 13-14.
248. See id.
249. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2242 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
250. Id.
251. Terms of Service: Your Content in Our Services, GOOGLE,
[https://perma.cc/Y4M8-BR9L] (last updated Oct. 25, 2017). "Some of our services allow
you to upload, submit, store, send or receive content. You retain ownership of any
intellectual property rights that you hold in that content. In short, what belongs to you
stays yours." Id.
252. Sullivant v. Pa. Fire Ins., 223 Ark. 721, 724, 268 S.W.2d 372, 373-74 (1954)
(citation omitted).
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establish bailment: (1) actual delivery to the bailee, (2)
acceptance by the bailee, and (3) sole and temporary custody by
the bailee.253 If these elements are met, any issues with the
company still being in possession of the data are bypassed.
Assuming that a user's data is their property, 254 most
devices and settings allow technology companies to periodically
obtain and store user data on their servers or cloud.255 This
would constitute actual delivery. 256  Because the technology
companies establish this process, acceptance of the user's data is
implied. Whether a company has sole and temporary control
over data could present an issue. Most companies allow users to
access, modify, and delete their stored data to some extent.257 In
Arkansas, a bailor must part control with their property to
establish a bailment.258  But consider the purpose of the
bailment: users turn over their data for storage and safe keeping
or to improve their services.259
If a user stores information with a company for safe
keeping, an analogy can be drawn to a safety deposit box.
Safety deposit boxes can be a form of bailment between the
bank and the patron who rents the box.260  There is nothing
stopping a safety deposit box owner from accessing the contents
of his box multiple times a day. If he does so, his bailment
would still continue to exist.261  Similarly, a user would not
253. See HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAW OF DAMAGES §
17:5, at 299 (5th ed. 2004) (citing Bertig Bros. v. Norman, 101 Ark. 75, 81, 141 S.W. 201,
204 (1911)).
254. See supra Part IV(b).
255. See supra Part I(a).
256. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 41 (2019).
257. See supra Parts I(a), IV(b).
258. Tedder v. Blackmon's Auctions Inc., 274 Ark. 241, 243-44, 623 S.W.2d 516,
517-18 (1981) (finding no bailment between owner and auctioneer where owner was
present during the auction and was free to take the vehicles at any time).
259. See Sullivant v. Pa. Fire Ins., 223 Ark. 721, 732-24, 268 S.W.2d 372, 373-74
(1954) (citations omitted); see also supra Part I(a).
260. See Farmers Bank of Greenwood v. Perry, 301 Ark. 547, 552-53, 787 S.W.2d
645, 648 (1990) (finding a non-gratuitous bailment); Liability for Loss of Contents of Safe
Deposit Box, 40 A.L.R. 874 (1926) [hereinafter Liability for Loss of Contents].
261. See Farmers Bank, 301 Ark. at 559, 787 S.W.2d at 651 (Hays, J., dissenting);
Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent's E-Mails: Inheritable
Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 281, 310
(2007).
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jeopardize their bailment by accessing their data or cloud
contents.
Furthermore, this analogy also helps defeat other potential
concerns, such as third-party access. A safety deposit box
requires a key for access. 262 Such a key is usually possessed by
the owner and the bank.263 Perhaps the bank had to store the
safety deposit box at another location-would this give the new
location or entity access to its contents? Large technology
companies often use third-party servers to store mass amounts of
data.2 64 However, when they do so, the company encrypts the
data. 265  Like a safety deposit box, a special key is needed to
unencrypt the data.266  Thus, some required method of
protection-such as encryption or password-utilized by either
the user or company before the data is sent to the Cloud or a
third party could work to defeat third-party claims to the
information.
Bailment provides an extra layer of protection due to its
quasi-contract-property law nature. 267  Because contract
principles are present in bailment law, a company can further
define the terms of the bailment through agreements with users.
Such agreements could come in the forms of terms and
conditions or privacy policies. Conceivably, a company could
disclose that it will, for example, use data to improve your
services or store your data in a remote server owned by a
different company and still preserve the bailment, thus, still
providing users' data with Fourth Amendment protections.
262. See Liability for Loss of Contents, supra note 260.
263. See id.
264. See Ivan Widjaya, How Do Large Companies Store and Manage Digital
Information?, CLOUD BUS. REVS. (Apr. 11, 2018), [https://perma.cc/M2YL-R5LB].
265. See Cloud Encryption: Using Data Encryption in the Cloud, BUS[NESS.COM
(July 3, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7MYC-VW3V].
266. See A Deep Dive on End-to-End Encryption: How Do Public Key Encryption
Systems Work?, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, [https://perma.cc/753C-PAVN] (last
updated Nov. 29, 2018); Michael Grothaus, Apple Should Borrow These 4 Privacy
Features from the Competition, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 31, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3TLM-
XTCW].
267. See Bailments, supra note 256, § 30.
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D. Role of State Legislature
While Arkansas may be willing to depart from federal
precedent for Fourth Amendment cases, attorneys must make
their state law arguments using a sparse collection of case law.
To make up for lack of case law, attorneys will have to rely on
persuasive authority. Alternatively, the Arkansas legislature
could enact laws that give Arkansans a possessory right in their
data. Other states have enacted such legislation on a variety of
other topics. For example, Alaska limits how DNA may be
collected and analyzed, while also giving the people property
rights in their DNA.268
This approach would not automatically solve all Fourth
Amendment issues regarding data. Instead, it assumes that a
positive law model-as advocated for by Justice Gorsuch-is in
place. Under a positive law model, government action would be
in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the governmental agent,
when "stripped of [his] official authority," was acting in a
manner that was tortious, criminal, or in violation of another
law. 269 Neither Arkansas nor federal courts have expressly
adopted a positive law model. However, by enacting legislation
creating a property right in data, Arkansas defendants would
then have the green light to begin making such arguments.
V. CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long struggled with
how to properly integrate new technology and the legal issues it
brings into the doctrine. Defining citizens' rights through a
property law analysis was one of the early approaches. Though
this approach is not perfect, it creates the most flexible
framework for Fourth Amendment analysis. Additionally, the
concept of judicial federalism paired with property law derived
from state law allows states to take the reins in defining Fourth
Amendment rights in the Cloud.
268. Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and
the Evolving Fourth Amendment, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 109 (2018). See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.13.010 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 760.40(2)(a) (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-
102(a)(i) (2009).
269. William Baude & James Y. Stem, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1821, 1825-26 (2016).
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Arkansas property law can preserve a user's interest and
privacy in data despite the user sharing such data with
technology companies, through the Cloud, or with other devices.
In applying case law, a user's data exhibits the elements of
ownership necessary for a property interest. Where the law may
be lacking or subject to debate, the law of bailment can serve as
a workaround to the third-party doctrine. Such a framework can
work for various devices and data that have unique storage and
sharing capabilities. Furthermore, the Arkansas legislature can
step in and create a statutory property right in data to allow
defendants to make positive law arguments. Finally, this
framework is one that can, presumably, apply to most
conceivable future technology without requiring great deviation.
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